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INTRODUCTION
Evaluating the Drivers’ amended complaint under the proper pleading
standard—and not the one requiring “specificity” the ICE Agents have
manufactured—reveals that at best, the ICE Agents motion to dismiss is premature
as disputes of historical facts exist, including (1) the availability and content of the
Drivers’ citizenship information on file with the Philadelphia Parking Authority
(the “PPA”), (2) the reasonableness of the ICE Agents’ inclusion of the Drivers on
the list after searching two databases and taking a year to execute the investigation,
and (3) whether the Drivers were asked to remain at the PPA and voluntarily
agreed after their citizenship had been confirmed or whether the Drivers were
expressly told they could not leave.
The ICE Agents spend much of their brief asserting that the Drivers have not
pled facts sufficient to entitle them to relief or to show that the ICE Agents are not
entitled to qualified immunity. These assertions, however, are based on the ICE
Agents’ attempt to disregard, recast, and cherry-pick the facts in the amended
complaint surrounding their arrest and interrogation of the Drivers. But the ICE
Agents ignore that all of the Drivers’ factual allegations in their Complaint must be
accepted as true, and the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to
the Drivers. Moreover, the ICE Agents ignore that it is their burden to establish
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they are entitled to qualified immunity and that their declarations may not be
considered in support.
Accordingly, the district court’s order granting the defendant-appellees’
motion to dismiss should be vacated and this case should be remanded with
instructions to allow the plaintiff-appellants to amend their complaint if necessary
and for additional discovery.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ICE AGENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY FOR INTERROGATING THE DRIVERS.
The ICE Agents have not proven that they are entitled to qualified immunity

for their arrest and interrogation of the Drivers. Reasonable ICE agents in the
circumstances would know that a self-imposed failure to confirm the Drivers’
citizenship cannot create probable cause or reasonable suspicion justifying such
intrusion on the Drivers’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable
search and seizures. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (detailing the
two-part test for qualified immunity). See also Burns v. PA Dep’t of Corr., 642
F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The burden of establishing qualified immunity falls
to the official claiming it as a defense.”). Rather, the existence of disputed
historical facts—including the availability and content of the Drivers’ citizenship
information on file with the PPA, and the reasonableness of the ICE Agents’
inclusion of the Drivers on the list after searching two databases and taking a year

-2-
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to execute the investigation— highlights the need for discovery and renders the
ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss premature. See Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278
(3d Cir. 2002) (“[A] decision on qualified immunity will be premature when there
are unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity analysis” as “the
existence of disputed, historical facts material to the objective reasonableness of an
officer’s conduct will give rise to a jury issue.”).
Regarding the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis—whether the
facts alleged by the Drivers show a violation of a constitutional right—the Drivers
have pled sufficient facts to show that the ICE Agents violated their Fourth
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures when they arrested and
interrogated the Drivers absent either probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
The Drivers plainly established that the ICE Agents’ authority to interrogate
and arrest suspected aliens under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a)(1) and (a)(2), respectively,
is constrained by the Fourth Amendment, “which demands something more than
the broad and unlimited discretion sought by the Government.” AOB 21-29, citing
U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (rejecting the government’s
assertion that warrantless seizures under § 1357(a)(1) may be justified solely an
immigration agent’s discretion). Accordingly, arrests under § 1357(a)(2) must be
justified by probable cause, Olivia-Ramos v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 694 F.3d 259,

-3-
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285 (3d Cir. 2012), while interrogations under § 1357(a)(1) must be justified by
reasonable suspicion, Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
The ICE Agents fail to address this well-settled principle, instead suggesting
that this statutory authority provides them with carte blanche qualified immunity.
See, e.g., AB 29 (“The Drivers’ detention for purposes of ascertaining their
immigration status is part of the Agents’ job, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357, even if
the Drivers were ultimately determined to be U.S. Citizens.”). Indeed, despite 13
pages in the Drivers’ initial brief addressing the significance of section 1357, see
generally AOB 21-34, the ICE Agents make the flatly untrue statement that “the
Drivers fail to address the fact that the appellee ICE Agents were authorized by
statute to interrogate persons like the Drivers who are suspected of being in the
U.S. illegally.” AB 16.
Moreover, the ICE Agents’ attempt to frame the constitutional right at issue
here as a question of whether their conduct in “compiling the list” violated the
Constitution is a red herring. The Drivers agree that compiling a list does not
violate the Constitution without anyone acting on the list. But what the ICE
Agents did with the list runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s protections: they
arrested the Drivers under purported suspicion of being aliens in the U.S. illegally,
using the list to claim probable cause. The list, however, cannot provide the
necessary probable cause first because it was the product of the ICE Agents’

-4-

Case: 13-1881

Document: 003111346562

Page: 10

Date Filed: 08/05/2013

inability to confirm the Drivers’ citizenship based on their own needlessly deficient
investigation as such information was readily available with the PPA and other less
intrusive methods were available. It also could not provide probable cause even if
adequately investigated because it was of such a general nature that only an
interrogation under reasonable suspicion could possibly have been reasonable.
The ICE Agents’ initial seizure of the Drivers—and they do not dispute that
they seized the Drivers—constitutes an arrest. The ICE Agents dispute that the
seizure was an arrest because “[t]he agents planned to question the Drivers
pursuant to § 1357(a)(1),” and there was “no plan to arrest any person who was
identified as a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.” AB 7. But this misses
the point: the ICE Agents subjective intent is irrelevant. See Whren v. U.S., 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). 1
In further support of the ICE Agents’ assertion that there was no arrest, they
point to the fact that “although the Drivers allege that they were ‘attacked, thrown
against the wall,’ and ‘told [they] were being arrested, at no time was any one of

1

Nevertheless, the ICE Agents’ brief inaccurately restates McDonald’s declaration
on this subject. McDonald did not declare that there was “no plan to arrest any
person identified as a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident” as the ICE
Agents’ brief asserts, AB 7; rather, he stated, “The plan did not include arresting or
holding any drivers beyond the time of their being identified as legally in the U.S.”
JA74 (emphasis added).

-5-
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the Drivers transported away from the PPA facility as were others who were placed
under arrest because they were discovered to be in the U.S. illegally,” AB 7-8, and
the Drivers were only handcuffed “because the PPA facility was not a secure
facility and the agents had no way of knowing if any of the drivers would be
armed,” AB 7. This factual narrative is irrelevant and self-servingly incomplete.
The ICE Agents’ purported justification for handcuffing the Drivers and throwing
them against the wall does not change the fact that they placed the Drivers under
severe custody characteristic only of an arrest. See U.S. v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99,
105 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that whether an arrest has occurred is an objective
inquiry based on “what a reasonable person would believe based on the
circumstances of the interrogation”).
Moreover, the ICE Agents ignore that besides being told they were being
arrested, thrown against the wall, and handcuffed, the ICE Agents and their
subordinates also took the Drivers’ identification documents, JA47, 52, 56;
displayed weapons, JA49, 53, 59, 74-75; were dressed in raid gear, id.; had twentytwo ICE agents present, JA74; and interrogated each plaintiff for over an hour,
JA48, 52, 57. These circumstances demonstrate that a reasonable person in the
Drivers’ position would believe they were under arrest.
Moreover, no probable cause existed to arrest the Drivers because the list
was not reasonably trustworthy information to warrant a person of reasonable

-6-
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caution to conclude that the Drivers were aliens in the country illegally and that
they were likely to escape before a warrant for their arrest could be obtained. See
U.S. v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[Probable cause] exists
whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within an arresting
officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to
conclude that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being
arrested.”); §1357(a)(2).2 Here, the absence of documentation confirming the
Drivers’ status cannot rise to the level of indicating that they are, in fact, likely to
be illegal aliens. See Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno, 51 F.3d 216 (9th Cir.
1995) (recognizing that “although the lack of documentation or other admission of
illegal presence may be some indication of illegal entry, it does not, without more,
provide probable cause of the criminal violation of illegal entry”).
U.S. v. Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237 (8th Cir. 2010), does not counsel otherwise.
The ICE Agent’s reliance on Quintana to provide an analogous case is misplaced
as the case is easily distinguishable. The absence of the plaintiff’s name in a
records search provided probable cause in Quintana because the context was a
traffic stop where the thoroughness of such a search and availability of other
2

Under § 1357(a)(2),immigration officials are statutorily permitted, without a
warrant, to “arrest any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the
alien is . . . in violation of any such law or regulation [regarding the admission,
exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens] and is likely to escape before a warrant
can be obtained . . . .”

-7-
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options is extremely limited if it is to be reasonable. Here, however, no such
restrictions existed as the ICE Agents did not execute the operation plan until over
a year later. That the ICE Agents would suggest a cursory, minutes-long search is
analogous to the facts here raises its own questions. Moreover, the Border Patrol
Agent in Quintana had reason to believe that the alien was likely to escape before a
warrant could be obtained. That is not the case here. No evidence exists to
suggest that the Drivers were, at any time, an escape risk, and the ICE Agents have
not argued otherwise.
Regardless, whether the ICE Agents’ seizure of the Drivers constitutes an
arrest under §1357(a)(2), or an interrogation under §1357(a)(1), requiring
reasonable suspicion, is of no matter. In determining whether an officer had
reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court has considered the “totality of the
circumstances,” and “whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and
objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2001) (overturning lower court’s formalistic methodology for determining
reasonable suspicion). Under either analysis, the scope of the seizure was not
reasonably related to the ICE Agents’ purpose of identifying illegal aliens,
balanced against the Drivers’ right to be free from unreasonable seizures, see Lee
v. INS, 590 F.2d 497, 499-500 (3d Cir. 1979), and the list did not provide sufficient
justification.

-8-
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First, the scope of the ICE Agents’ seizure of the Drivers is not sufficiently
limited in scope. The seizure posed a far more significant burden than necessary to
effectuate the ICE Agents’ purpose of identifying illegal aliens. Indeed, the decoy
refund scheme the ICE Agents’ created to lure the cab drivers to the PPA for a
secret arrest and interrogation, where the Drivers were thrown against the wall,
handcuffed, and interrogated for over an hour is a far cry from the routine
questioning in Lee, 590 F.2d at 502 (finding that an officer’s questioning of
individuals was justified in scope, given that he merely approached the individuals
speaking in Chinese near a restaurant known to hire illegal immigrants, identified
himself as an agent, and inquired about their identity) or INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 218 (1984) (finding that an INS agent’s questioning of factory workers was
justified in scope as the factory workers were allowed to continue with their
routine despite the agents’ presence). Moreover, the interrogations lasted over an
hour, JA48, 52, 57, which is far longer than the momentary interrogations found to
be reasonable in scope in cases like Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880 (given the
interests of border patrol agents in securing the borders, it is reasonable to allow
agents to illicit “a response to a brief question or two and possibly the production
of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States”).
Importantly, the ICE Agents fail to explain why other less objectively and
subjectively intrusive methods were not used where the ICE Agents were unable to

-9-
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confirm citizenship such as individually questioning the Drivers outside the
context of this operation or sending them a different letter from the PPA requesting
updated citizenship information for payroll purposes.
Second, the list does not create reasonable suspicion. That the ICE Agents
were purportedly unable to confirm the Drivers’ citizenship results from their own
unreasonable failing. See JA46, 73-74. See also Orhorhaghe v. I.N.S., 38 F.3d
488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding a plaintiff’s “Nigerian-sounding name” and the
absence of his name in INS records for lawful entry into the U.S. did not create
reasonable suspicion he was illegally in the country); Benitez-Mendez v. INS, 760
F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that a border patrol officer who knew only
that an alien was working in the fields and his co-workers had fled upon sight of
marked border patrol detail, that the individual was an alien, and that alien claimed
to possess documents showing his legal status, did not have reasonable suspicion to
believe individual was an alien illegally in the U.S.) .
The ICE Agents conclusory statement that the PPA did not have
immigration information for the Drivers, see AB 27, is belied by the fact that the
PPA Enforcement Manager stated that they had information such as “ Social
Security numbers and things like that.” AB 22 (quoting JA92). And as the ICE
Agents must certainly know, Social Security Numbers can be used to confirm
United States citizenship. To the extent the ICE Agents claim the Drivers may

- 10 -
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have forged that information, they provide no factual basis supporting reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to believe any drivers had done so.
The ICE Agents assert that that they are entitled to qualified immunity for
reasonable mistakes, AB 30, but they fail to explain how their mistake of arresting
the Drivers was reasonable. Even though the ICE Agents state that they checked
“immigration databases” and ran “criminal history” checks, JA73, they offer no
information on what these databases and history checks said about the Drivers
here. Indeed, in U.S. v. Quintana,—the same case the ICE Agents rely upon to
claim their arrest of the Drivers was based on probable cause—the Eighth Circuit
admonished the Border Patrol Agents for failing to make “a better showing that the
databases preliminarily searched by Agent Bane and the Grand Forks Patrol
Dispatch are sufficiently thorough and complete to permit a reasonable Border
Patrol Agent to infer that [the plaintiff] was present in the country illegally.” 623
F.3d at 1241.3
And the faulty premise that the year span initiation and execution of the
operation and the fact that various versions of the list were exchanged therein
reflects a thorough investigation ignores that, taken in the light most favorable to
the Drivers, rather than reflect diligence, this delay indicates neglect, inefficiency,
3

The Border Patrol’s failure to provide such information was not dispositive there
because the plaintiff’s reply memorandum did not challenge the database or the
inference the Border Patrol Agent drew. Id.

- 11 -
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and non-urgency, as established by the ICE Agents’ failure to determine the
Drivers’ citizenship despite readily available evidence and ICE’s tremendous
resources. Indeed, this dispute of historical fact illustrates yet another reason why
discovery is necessary and the ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss is premature. See
Curley, 298 F.3d at 278 (“[T]he existence of disputed, historical facts material to
the objective reasonableness of an officer's conduct will give rise to a jury issue.”).
Lastly, as required under the second prong of the qualified immunity
analysis—that the Drivers’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures must be “clearly established”—and detailed in the Drivers’ initial brief,
AOB 29-34, the ICE Agents have failed to show that reasonably competent ICE
agents would believe that the ICE Agents’ arrest and interrogation of the Drivers
was lawful because the Supreme Court has directly addressed the boundaries of the
Fourth Amendment and §1357. Therefore, no reasonably competent ICE agent can
be excused from knowing that seizures grounded in anything less than probable
cause or reasonable suspicion are unlawful.
II.

THE ICE AGENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY FOR CONTINUING TO DETAIN THE DRIVERS
AFTER CONFIRMING THEIR CITIZENSHIP.
The ICE Agents and their subordinates have also not shown that they are

entitled to qualified immunity for their continued detention of the Drivers for
several hours after confirming their citizenship. Such detention cannot be based in

- 12 -
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reasonable suspicion when the ICE Agents confirmed their citizenship, even to
their own satisfaction, and no reasonable ICE agent would believe otherwise.
The ICE Agents agree with the Drivers on the law governing when a seizure
has occurred. AB 32. The ICE Agents, however, claim that the Drivers do not
meet these standards based on their own incomplete factual narrative. But this
they may not do. All of the Drivers’ factual allegations in the complaint must be
accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the Drivers. Byers v.
Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010).
The ICE Agents’ declarations, however, should not be considered in
determining the ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss because they constitute evidence
beyond the complaint and, unlike the exhibits attached to the Drivers’ response, do
not fall within the limited exception “for documents that are integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” See West Penn Allegheny Health Sys.,
Inc., v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation and marks omitted).
Further, converting the ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment so that the court may consider the declarations would also be improper as
the Drivers have not been provided “reasonable opportunity to present all material
that is pertinent to the motion” as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). At this
time, no discovery has taken place, and the Drivers have not had the opportunity to
refute the ICE Agents’ declaration. Regardless, the ICE Agents’ declarations do
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not rebut the Drivers’ allegations in their amended complaint—they further
establish a triable issue fact on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to
leave. See JA73-76.
The ICE Agents’ brief claims the Drivers’ travel was unrestricted. AB 17.
But that is flat untrue. The amended complaint alleges that their travel was
restricted, and the declarations do no state otherwise. In any event, even if the ICE
Agents would have let them go had they walked out the open door, the standard is
not the ICE Agents’ subjective intent. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, (1968) (“If
subjective good faith [on the part of the arresting officer] alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be
‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of the
police.”). Rather, it is whether a reasonable person would have believed he was
not free to leave in the situation of the Drivers in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the arrest and interrogation. Olivia-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 283-84.
Given that the ICE Agents and their subordinates had already forcibly
detained the Drivers by the ICE Agents’ own admission, AB 7, repeatedly told the
Drivers that they were not permitted to leave despite being wrongfully seized,
JA48, 53, 58, refused to allow them to speak or stand, JA48, 53, 58, and were
dressed in raid gear and/or displaying guns strapped to their waists, including those
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who stood by the exit, JA48, 49, 53, 58; see JA74-75, no reasonable person would
believe he was free to get up and leave.
The ICE Agents suggest at several places that they simply “ask[ed] the
drivers to remain,” e.g., JA35, but they cite no support for that assertion, and their
inadmissible hearsay declarations are not supported with direct quotes or even
direct knowledge of what was actually said to the Drivers. See JA76 (“Between
0900 and 1000 hours, one team member told me that it had been suggested to the
in-status drivers that they remain at the facility for a brief time after they had been
processed, for officer safety reasons. I was told that those drivers appeared to
understand the reason for the request, and willingly complied.”). Perhaps most
importantly, given the context of the already-existing undisputed seizure, no
reasonable person would feel free to leave until and unless the seizing authorities
with guns expressly stated he was free to leave. No declaration claims that the
agents affirmatively told the Drivers they were free to leave.
Moreover, the Drivers’ specifically pled that they were repeatedly advised
that they were not permitted to leave, JA48, 49, 53, 58; plaintiff Shittu directly
asked if he was permitted to leave but was told that “he had to sit in the room with
the other taxi drivers who had been detained and was not permitted to leave,”
JA49, and plaintiff Lawal expressly told the ICE Agents and their subordinates that
“he just wanted to leave,” JA58. These facts, accepted as true and construed in the

- 15 -
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light most favorable to the Drivers, demonstrate that their continued detention was
neither a voluntary choice nor consensual in nature. Regardless, to the extent the
ICE Agents justify their conduct in continuing to detain the Drivers based on the
Drivers’ purported voluntary agreement to remain at the PPA, this dispute of
historical fact provides another example of why the ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss
is premature. See Curley, 298 F.3d at 278.
The ICE Agents do not dispute that they had no evidence on which to have a
reasonable suspicion to detain the Drivers. They claim continued detention was
justified for safety reasons, but they do not connect those safety reasons to any
articulable reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct by the Drivers. And the mere
possibility or subjective feeling that someone might be tipped off about an
operation does not justify detaining everyone who knows about the operation. See,
e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (“To insist neither upon an
appropriate factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular [individual] nor upon
some other substantial and objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of
discretion ‘would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches . . . .”) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
at 22); see also Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting officer’s belief that a suspect’s friend “knew more than he was willing to
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say” about the suspect as sufficient to justify his continued detention because such
conjecture was not anchored in any factual observation).
Further, the ICE Agents’ reliance on U.S. v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 616 (3d Cir.
1995), to support their safety rationale for suspicionless detention is misplaced. 4
See AB 34. The court’s statement in Edwards that officers may “take such steps as
are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status
quo,” is predicated on the fact that the officers conducting the Terry stop had
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a crime had been committed—
the court did not hold that concerns with officers’ safety justified a suspicionless
detention. Id. at 618-19.
Moreover, it is absurd. The agents’ post-hoc claim of safety concerns
assumes that these “armed” cab drivers would launch an assault on the facility
rather than simply choose not to appear at the facility if they were tipped off. Even
if such a rationale existed, non-individualized concerns are insufficient to justify
continued seizure of the Drivers. ICE Agents cannot be permitted to invade
citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights absent any evidence whatsoever by merely
citing attenuated and fantastic safety concerns.

4

Notably, the ICE Agents’ assertion that they merely asked the Drivers to remain
(and they did so voluntarily) undermines the seriousness of the ICE Agents’
purported safety concerns.
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Moreover, in light of the requirement announced in Brignoni-Ponce that
immigration officials may only exercise their authority to conduct warrantless
seizures where reasonable suspicion exists, a reasonably competent ICE agent
would know that continued detention of a U.S. citizen without a reasonable
suspicion violates a clearly established constitutional right. In light of the
draconian detention methods employed by the ICE Agents—holding the Drivers
against their will for several hours, and prohibiting them to stand, speak or leave
the room, JA48-49, 53,57-59—no reasonable ICE agent would believe his conduct
was a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment . And any ICE agent
reasonably aware of the law would understand that continuing to detain the Drivers
for hours after confirming their citizenship would rise to a level far greater than a
de minimis level of detention; rather, such confinement constitutes an unreasonable
seizure in light of the clear contours of this jurisprudence.
III.

BIVENS CLAIMS DO NOT NEED TO BE PLED WITH
SPECIFICITY.
The facts pleaded in the amended complaint need only state a plausible

claim for relief. They do so, and the district court erred in holding otherwise.
When considering a motion to dismiss, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
directs courts to ignore legal conclusions, to accept a complaint’s facts as true, and
to apply a standard of plausibility to those facts. The ICE Agents, however, ask
this court to ignore the facts in the amended complaint, to accept the ICE Agents’
- 18 -
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preferred version of the facts—unsupported by even their own declarations—and
to apply a standard of specificity to the ICE Agents preferred facts.
The ICE Agents’ primarily argue the Drivers did not allege personal
involvement with sufficient specificity. See AB 20, 21. See also JA9-10 (stating
the amended complaint did not identify “each Defendant’s specific actions”
(emphasis added)). But specificity is not required. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2006) (“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of
specifics.”).
The amended complaint alleges many non-conclusory facts. The ICE
Agents assert that the Drivers “allege only that ‘Defendants were present for and
participated directly’ in the conduct [that violated the Drivers’ rights]” and assert
one reason this allegation is “insufficiently particular” is “because the allegations
are wholly lacking in any factual specificity indicating any individual Agent’s
conduct or knowledge.” AB 20. But a review of the amended complaint reveals
otherwise. Regarding personal involvement, the Amended Complaint alleges
“McDonald, Riley and Chow,” JA46:
x “exchanged various versions of the certified operator list in an effort to
create a working list,” JA46;
x directed letters be sent to the Drivers advising each he was entitled to a
refund, JA46, 47;
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x “suddenly and violently attacked [each driver], thr[ew] [him] against a wall
and handcuffed [him],” JA47, 48, 52, 56, 57;
x were told by the Drivers that the Drivers were citizens, JA48, 52, 57;
x “interrogated [each driver] for more than one hour,” JA48, 52, 57;
x admitted to each driver the driver “had been mistakenly detained,” JA48, 53,
57, 58;
x nonetheless “repeatedly advised [each driver] that he was not permitted to
leave,” JA48, 49, 53, 53, 58;
x held the Drivers “for several additional hours,” JA48, 53, 58; and
x prohibited the Drivers from “speak[ing] or stand[ing]” while held JA48, 53,
58.
Defendants ignore these factual allegations and ask this Court to do the same, the
law directs otherwise.
And these facts are entitled to a presumption of truth. The ICE Agents
incorrectly assert “[t]his Court is not required to assume . . . nonspecific allegations
are true.” AB 15-16. Again, specificity is not the standard. Instead, “a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint” except “legal
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The facts laid out above are not legal
conclusions; they recount events and are entitled to a presumption of truth.
Ignoring the Supreme Court’s directive, the ICE Agents contradict the factual
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allegations to create a narrative they prefer. Indeed, their statement of facts cites
sources other than the amended complaint and decision almost exclusively,
acknowledging the amended complaint’s existence only once outside the opening
and closing paragraphs of their five-page fact section. AB 6-10. In considering
the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, it is the ICE Agents’ statement of
facts that should be ignored, not the well-pleaded facts in the amended complaint.
Moreover, these facts state a plausible claim for relief. The ICE Agents
concede personal involvement “can be shown through allegations of personal
direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence.” AB 19. Regarding facts, they
concede “Special Agent McDonald compiled the list of drivers invited to the PPA
facility located at 2415 S. Swanson Street, in Philadelphia,” id. at 6, and
“supervised the operation primarily from the first room the drivers entered, and
circulated among the other rooms from time to time,” id. at 9. They further
concede Chow was present during the operation, arriving at the facility “to see how
the operation was going.” Id. at 8. These concessions alone are sufficient to
demonstrate that, at the very least, the ICE Agents knew what was going on and
acquiesced in it. The amended complaint’s allegations further establish these
things for all the ICE Agents—because the ICE Agents themselves admitted to the
Drivers they had been “mistakenly detained” and could not leave, the ICE Agents
necessarily knew of the violations. The personal involvement standard recognizes
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it was incumbent upon the supervisory agents to respect the Drivers’ rights and
release them as soon as the ICE Agents knew what was going on. By not doing so,
and acquiescing in the Drivers’ detention, the supervisory agents themselves
violated the Drivers’ rights. As the concessions and pleadings establish knowledge
and acquiescence without speculation, the Drivers state a plausible claim for relief.
The ICE Agents cite Iqbal and Rode v. Dellarciprete, as cases dismissing
supervisors for lack of personal involvement. Id. at 19. However, those cases are
distinguishable because they involved imposing liability on people “at the highest
level[s] of the . . . law enforcement hierarch[ies],” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668,—the
governor and attorneys general—not boots-on-the ground agents. Id.; Rode, 845
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rode attempted to establish knowledge through
“articles that appeared in newspapers throughout the state,” “through the
introduction of a legislative resolution seeking an investigation into racially
motivated retaliation against PSP employees, the filing of grievances with the
Governor’s office of administration, and telephone calls and correspondence with
the office of the Lieutenant Governor.” 845 F.2d at 1208. The complaint did not
allege the governor or attorney general were present for any of the wrongs, or that
they even read the newspaper articles or reviewed the complaints. See id.
Iqbal is also distinguishable because it involved Bivens liability for
“invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments,”
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which the Supreme Court’s “decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and
prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
676. The ICE Agents wrongly suggest all Bivens liability requires an intentional
violation of constitutional rights. AB 7, 23. However, “[t]he factors necessary to
establish a Bivens violation . . . vary with the constitutional provision at issue,”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, and plaintiffs need not plead or prove purpose for Fourth
Amendment violations. See supra Parts I, II. In Iqbal, the plaintiff’s allegations in
ultimately failed because the actions pled were “merely consistent with” a
discriminatory purpose, not necessarily done because of that purpose. 556 U.S. at
678. Because the drivers need not prove purpose, they need not allege purpose and
their allegations that demonstrate participation, knowledge, and acquiescence are
sufficient.
Heightening the pleading standard on Bivens claims would eviscerate the
doctrine. Rarely does an officer violating a citizen’s rights stop to make sure the
citizen has his name for a future lawsuit. Nor can citizens be expected to take
copious notes in order to eventually draft a complaint with specificity. The ICE
Agents comment that “the Drivers allege that they themselves were present . . . yet
no Driver can identify any Agent,” AB 21, not only ignores the allegations in the
Amended Complaint, but also ignores that Bivens itself involved unnamed agents.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Here,
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there are numerous culpable unnamed agents who likely will be added to the
complaint after more discovery. 5 But the fact that there are other culpable
unnamed agents does not make the named agents any less culpable.

5

To the extent the failure to include John Doe defendants was a deficiency in the
pleadings, “the District Court should not have dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims
without either granting leave to amend or concluding that any amendment would
be futile.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants Oliver Lawal, Daosamid Bounthisane,
and Gazali Shittun respectfully request that this Court reverse the judgment below.

s/ Tillman J. Breckenridge
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